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An Insider's Perspective on the Significance of
the German Criminal Theory's General System
for Analyzing Criminal Acts
Professor Dr. Wolfgang Naucke*

Over the past several years, increasing attention has been
paid in the United States to German criminal law and criminal
theory. This is a reflection not only of the preeminent position
of German criminal law in countries outside the common law orbit,' but also of the burgeoning literature on the German criminal system in the United state^.^ This article 'explores one of the
* Vice President, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt a.M., West Germany; Professor of Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, Criminology, and Legal Philosophy, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University. An earlier version o f this paper was presented
to the law faculty at U.C.L.A. during 1979. The author wishes to thank Mr. David Morrison, J.D., who was a Fulbright Scholar at the faculty of law, University o f Frankfurt a.M.
in 1979, for assistance in translating this paper. He also wishes to thank Professor W .
Cole Durham, Jr. o f the J . Reuben Clark Law School for assistance in preparation of the
introduction to this article and in making a number o f refinements in the text.
1. See Hall & Wagner, Foreword to Symposium: The New German Penal Code, 24
AM.J. COMP.
L. 589, 589 (1976); Durham, Book Review, 1979 UTAHL. REV.629, 634.
RETHINKING
CRIMINAL
LAW (1978); J. LANGBEIN,
COMPARA2. See, eg., G. FLETCHER,
T I V E CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE:
GERMANY
(1977); Arzt, Responses to the Growth of Crime in
the United States and West Germany: A Comparison of Changes in Criminal Law and
INT'L L.J. 43 (1979); Bradley, The Exclusionary Rule in
Societal Attitudes, 12 CORNELL
Germany, 96 HARV.L REV 1032 (1983); Clausnitzer, The Statute of Limitations for
Murder in the Federal Republic of Germany, 29 INT'L & COMP.L.Q. 473 (1980); Daly,
Intoxication and Crime: A Comparative Approach, 27 INT'L & COMP.L.Q. 378 (1978);
Damaska, The Reality of Prosecutorial Discretion: Comments on a German Monograph,
29 AM.J . COMP.
L. 119 (1981); Eser, The Politics of Criminal Law Reform: Germany, 21
AM.J. COMP.
L 245 (1973); Felstiner, Plea Contracts in West Germany, 13 LAW & SOC'Y
REV.309 (1979); Fletcher, The Right Deed for the Wrong Reason: A Reply to Mr. Robinson, 23 UCLA L. REV 293 (1975); Fletcher, Proportionality and the Psychotic Aggressor:
A Vignette in Comparative Criminal Theory, 8 ISRAEL L. REV.367 (1973); Fletcher, The
Theory of Criminal Negligence: A Comparative Analysis, 119 U. PA. L. REV.401 (1971);
Goldstein & Marcus, Comment on Continental Criminal Procedure, 87 Y A L EL.J. 1570
(1978); Goldstein & Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three "Inquisitorial"
Systems: France, Italy, and Germany, 87 YALEL.J. 240 (1977); Herrmann, The Rule of
Compulsory Prosecution and the Scope of Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany, 41 U.
CHI.L. REV.468 (1974); Horton, Life Imprisonment and Pardons in the German Federal
Republic, 29 INT'L & COMP.L.Q. 530 (1980); Horton, Abortion Law Reform in the Ger-

306

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I984

central structural features of German criminal law, which can be
described as the German theory's "general system for analyzing
criminal acts." (The underlying German term, Straftatsystem,
has no precise English equivalent and can also be translated as
the "general system for structuring criminal analysis," or more
briefly, as the "general analytical system" or as the "criminal
These phrases will be used interchangeably
analysis struct~re."~man Federal Republic, 28 INT'L& COMP.L.Q. 288 (1979); Hoskins, A Comparative Analysis of the Crime of Conspiracy i n Germany, France and the United States, 6 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 245 (1973); Hughes, Pleas Without Bargains, 33 RUTGERS
L. REV.753
(1981); Johnson & Drew, This Nation Has Money for Everything-Except Its Courts, 17
JUDGES'J , Summer 1978, a t 8; Kappel & Leuteritz, Wife Battering i n the Federal Republic o f Germany, 5 VICTIMOLOGY
225 (1980); Langbein, Judging Foreign Judges Badly:
J. 4 (1979); Langbein, Land Without Plea BarNose Counting Isn't Enough, 18 JUDGES'
gaining: How the Germans Do I t , 78 MICH.L. REV.204 (1979); Langbein & Weinreb,
Continental Criminal Procedure: "Myth" and Reality, 87 YALEL.J. 1549 (1978); McGehee, Child Abuse i n the Federal Republic of Germany, 6 VICTIMOLOGY
215 (1981);
O'Keefe & Czeniek, A S t u d y of the Drug Laws of the Federal Republic of Germany, 32
FOODDRUGCOSM.L.J. 488 (1977); Peltzer, T h e Criminal Responsibility and Personal
Liability of the Director i n the Bankruptcy of His Company: Germany, 9 INT'L BUS.
LAW.33 (1981); Scheerer, T h e New Dutch and German Drug Laws: Social and Political
Conditions for Criminalization and Decriminalization, 12 L. & SOC'YREV.585 (1978);
Silving, Comments o n Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws-A Comparative Analysis,
34 REVISTA
DEL COLEGIO
DE ABOGADOS
DE P.R. 107 (1973); Symposium: T h e New German
Penal Code, 24 AM. J. COMP.L. 589 (1976) (articles by Arzt, Binavince, Darby, Eser,
Fletcher, Hall, Herrmann, Luderssen, Oehler, Ryu, Silving, and Wagner); Teske & Arnold, Comparison o f the Criminal Statistics o f the United States and the Federal Republic o f Germany, 10 J. CRIMJUST.359 (1982); Volkmann-Schluck, Continental European Criminal Procedures: True or Illusive Model?, 9 AM.J. CRIM.L. 1 (1981); Weigend,
Sentencing i n West Germany, 42 MD L. REV. 37 (1983); Note, Anti-Terrorism: T h e
INT'L L.F. 167 (1980); Note, Positivist Roots of
West German Approach, 3 FORDHAM
Criminal Law and t h e West German Criminal Law Reform, 10 RUT.-CAM.L.J. 613
(1979); Comment, T h e West German Day-Fine System: A Possibility for the United
States?, 50 U . CHI. L. REV.281 (1983).
3. Literally translated, "Straftatsystem" means simply "criminal act system," but
this translation fails to convey the structural and methodological significance of the
Straftatsystem as a basic organizing principle of German criminal law. No translation of
the term can be fully adequate, since there is no precise equivalent to the Straftatsystem
within the American legal system and American legal practice. Thus, any set of English
words will fail to adequately convey what is involved because of the lack of a corresponding institutional referent within American legal culture. In an effort t o bridge this language gap, it has proven useful to employ a number of English terms that would not be
obvious choices a t the level of literal translation. The word "general" is added to indicate
the expectation that the Straftatsystem is the method of analysis to be applied in all
cases. Moreover, the Straftatsystem is general in the same sense that the "general part"
(allgemeiner Teil) of criminal law is general: it relates to features of criminal conduct
that go beyond the specific crimes of the "special part" (besonderer Teil). Not surprisingly, German texts on the general part are typically organized around the basic features
of the general system for structuring criminal analysis. See, e.g., J . BAUMANN.
LEHRBUCH
DES STRAFRECHTS:
STRAFRECHT:
ALLCEMEINER
TEIL(8th ed. 1977); H. JESCHECK,
ALLGEMEINER
TEIL (3d ed. 1978); R. MAURACH,
DEUTSCHES
STRAFRECHT:
ALLCEMEINER
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in this article to refer to the German Straftatsystem.) This system is an intellectual framework that defines and delimits the
approach that a German jurist adopts in determining whether
particular conduct violates the norms of the substantive criminal
law. It is parallel in systemic significance to the Model Penal
Code's innovative "element analysis" method~logy,~
but has
much deeper philosophical and cultural roots. This article will
TEIL (4th ed. 1971); E. SCHMIDH~USER,
STRAFRECHT:
ALLGEMEINER
TEIL (2d ed. 1975); G.
STRATENWERTH,
STRAFRECHT:
ALLGEMEINER
TEIL (3d ed. 1981).
T h e terms "analyzing" and "analytical" are used because the Straftatsystem is fundamentally concerned with what American lawyers would describe as legal analysis.
More particularly, the Straftatsystem provides a structure for analyzing the basic constituents of criminal liability: whether the relevant prohibitory norm has been violated,
whether justificatory circumstances are present, and whether culpability or accountability is negated by pertinent excusing conditions. Technically, i t might be more accurate to
think of the Straftatsystem as an effort a t "synthesis" rather than "analysis," since its
key function is to bring together the various constituents of liability and the wider values
that shape our thought about criminal norms, justifications, and excuses in a structured
methodology for resolving particular cases. But Americans tend to use the term "anelysis" indiscriminately t o cover both the "breaking down" (analytic) and the "gathering
together" (synthetic) aspects of the process of reasoning used in deciding cases. "Anslysis" is thus the better term to use in conveying the meaning of Straftatsystem to American lawyers.
The terms "structure" and "structuring" used in two of the suggested translations
reflect the fact that the Straftatsystem constitutes not only a method of analysis, but a
structure or structuring of thought. Perhaps these come to the same thing, but there are
contexts in which the structural dimension of the Straftatsystem is not adequately
evoked by the English word "system." The term System in German has stronger structural overtones than the cognate English term.
One further point about the term System must be made. T h e Straftatsystem is not
to be thought of as a system of criminal law in the sense that one might speak of a
"philosophical systemw-i.e., as a theoretical or metaphysical construct accounting for a
particular sector of thought or reality. This is not to say that German criminal theorists
have not utilized the Straftatsystem as a central feature of comprehensive accounts of
German criminal law. They have. Indeed, as noted above, most texts on the "general
part" of German criminal law are organized around the basic features of the Straftatsystem. Moreover, as this article contends, the general system for analyzing criminal acts
does reflect a constellation of values connected with the ideal of rule of law (Rechtsstaatlichkeit). Conceivably, in a n age more conducive to philosophical system building, a
criminal theorist might attempt to construct a system embodying these values. The point
for present purposes, however, is that Straftatsystem is to be thought of as a practical,
systematic method for structuring analysis of liability for criminal actions, rather than as
some particular thinker's philosophical systematization of criminal law.
German criminal law scholars often refer not only to the Straftatsystem, but also to
the Straftatlehre (literally, "criminal act doctrine"). The latter is merely the body of
doctrine or theory about the former. No effort has been made to distinguish between
translations of these two terms in this article, since from the perspective of American
readers, the two blend together as a linked theoretical approach to analyzing criminal
liability.
4. See generally Robinson & Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN.L. REV.681 (1983).
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describe how the general analytical system operates in practice
and will then explore the deeper values it reflects and protects.
My aim is to provide an overview of a central feature of German
criminal methodology, and then to reflect a t a more general level
on the relationship between legal methodology and legal values.

A. "Wild Postering": A Representative Problem
For those familiar with the significance of the "general theory for analyzing criminal actsw5in German criminal thought,
the topic addressed by this article may sound extremely broad. I
think, however, that the subject is central to a number of significant theoretical and practical issues. The nature of the subject
may become more clear if I begin with a legal issue that is currently the subject of frequent debate in Germany.
German courts are time and again confronted by the following set of facts: A group of young people has difficulty gaining
public attention for their political views, and to remedy this
problem they decide to "advertise." They have some posters
printed and paste them up as firmly as possible in as many locations as they see fit.6 The modern glues are quite permanent,
and the material is often bonded to the surface to which it is
attached. I t is usually a tremendous inconvenience to remove
the posters or fliers, and is sometimes impossible.
Under German criminal law, the question is whether the
foregoing conduct is sufficient to constitute the crime of damaging property under section 303 of the German Criminal Code.?
There are conflicting opinions, and the courtse and scholarse de5. See supra note 3.
6. In Germany this is called wildes Plakatieren, which may be translated as "wild
postering," or more tamely, as "unauthorized advertising."
7. Section 303 provides, "Wer rechtswidrig eine fremde Sache beschadigt oder zerstort, wird mit Freiheitsstrafe bis zu zwei Jahren oder mit Geldstrafe bestraft."
STRAFGESETZBUCH
[STGB] 9 303 (W. Ger.). This may be translated as follows: "Whoever
wrongfully damages or destroys an object not belonging to him shall be punished by
imprisonment for a term not to exceed two years or by a fine."
N
[JZ]
8. See Oberlandesgericht [OLG], Oldenburg, W. Ger., 1978 J U R I ~ T EZEITUNG
70; OLG, Karlsruhe, W. Ger., 1978 JZ 72; OLG, Oldenburg, W. Ger., 1978 NEUEJURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT
[NJW] 1656; OLG, Karlsruhe, W. Ger., 1978 NJW 1636; see also
1978 NJW 1637-42; Judgment of Nov. 13, 1979, Bundesgerichtshof in Strafsachen
[BGHST], W. Ger., 29 BGHST 129.
& F. SCHR~DER.
STRAFRECHT:
BESONDERER
TEIL 267 (6th
9. See, e.g., 1 R.MAURACH
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fend their views with numerous arguments. It is unsettled
whether firmly pasting a flier or poster on an object damages
that object. Those who believe that it does must turn to further
questions. Conceivably, such property damage is justified by the
right to freedom of speech. Even someone who does not accept
the argument that free speech rights legitimize property damage
might still argue that the young people should not be punished
because they (mistakenly) thought that their right to freedom of
speech justified their actions. These are difficult legal issues in
Germany and they place great demands on the breadth and precision of analysis.

B. Fundamental Tools of Legal Analysis in the German
System
The German lawyer must have total command of two fundamental and distinct tools of legal analysis to discuss properly
the question of the punishability of unauthorized advertising:
knowledge of the pertinent code sections and mastery of the
general system for analyzing criminal acts.
1. Knowledge of code provisions

Knowledge of the the pertinent code sections entails knowledge not only of the wording of the applicable statutory texts
but also a sound understanding of how they are to be interpreted. In the "wild postering" situation, one must know the
text of section 303 of the German Criminal Code. According to
the text of section 303, the damage or destruction of an object is
a prerequisite for liability. The German lawyer must be aware
that, according to the accepted interpretation of section 303,
cases of unauthorized advertising fall within the statute's prohibition of "damaging" as opposed to "destroying" property.l0 He
or she must also be conscious of the various legal interpretations
of the word "damage." Interpretations of this term are associed. 1977); STREE,
STRAFGESETZBUCH:
KOMMENTAR,
•˜ 303, Marginal No. 8 (A. Schonke & H.
SchrSder, 21st ed. 1982). For a summary of the various positions, see Dolling,
Sachbeschadigung durch Plakatieren uom Gebrauchsgegenstiinden, 1981 NJW 207;
Gossel, Wildes Plakatieren und Sachbeschadigung im Sinne des $ 303 STGB, 1980
JURISTISCHE
RUNDSCHAU
[JR] 184; Maiwald, Unbefugtes Plakatieren ohne Substanzuerletzung keine Sachbeschadigung?, 1980 J Z 256; Thoss, Sachbeschadigung
durch unbefugtes Plakatieren?, 1978 NJW 1612; Katzer, Das unbefugte Plakatieren als
Auslegungsproblem der Sachbeschadigung (8 303 STGB) (Diss. Frankfurt a.M. 1982).
10. See supra note 7 .
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ated with three different views of the interests protected by section 303. The interests protected by this statute might reflect
concerns with (1) the physical integrity of the object; (2) the object's functional capacities; or (3) the authority of the owner to
determine what can and cannot be done with the object." If the
protected interest is seen as the physical integrity or the functional capacity of the property, unauthorized advertising does
not constitute damaging property. Pasting up a placard usually
destroys neither the physical integrity nor the functional capacity of an object. If, on the other hand, the interest protected by
making it a crime to damage property is the owner's authority
over the object, then unauthorized advertising does constitute
damaging property. Indeed, unauthorized advertising unavoidably invades the authority of the owner over his property.
Familiarity with, and the ability to discuss, these issues are
part of the knowledge of the code that is required for a German
jurist to work effectively with section 303.

2. The general system for analyzing criminal acts
Familiarity with the code, however, does not provide the
German lawyer with enough knowledge to make a thorough legal
analysis of unauthorized advertising. He must also be master of
the second tool of legal analysis, the general system for analyzing criminal acts. In this general analytical system are collected
those features of crime that are common to all crimes, whether it
be damaging property, theft, murder, or anything else.12 If,
therefore, unauthorized advertising is to be punishable under
German law, it must be found to exhibit the general paradigmatic features of crime as determined by German criminal theory, as well as the particular elements of section 303 established
by statute.
By pouring the question of liability for specific conduct
through the filter of the general system for analyzing criminal
acts, we are adding something-and not just a little some11. See, e.g., G . ARZT,
STRAFRECHT.
BESONDERER
TEIL,VERM~GENSDELIKTE
9 ff. 1978;
& F SCHR~DER.
STRAFRECHT.
BESONDERER
TEIL265 ff. (6th ed. 1977)'('Das
1 R. MAURACH
Wesen der Sachbeschiidigung").
STRAFRECHT:
ALL12. For an overview of the West German literature, see BAUMANN,
CEMEINER TEIL171 ff. (8th ed. 1977); H. JESCHECK,
LEHRBUCH
DES STRAFRECHTS:
ALLCEMEINER TEIL155 ff. (3d ed. 1978); 1 R. MAURACH
& H. ZIPF, STRAFRECHT:
ALLCEMEINER
STRAFRECHT:
ALLGEMEINER
TEIL22 ff., 139
TEIL157 ff. (6th ed. 1983); E. SCHMIDHAUSER,
ff. (2d ed. 1975); G . STRATENWERTH.
STRAFRECHT:
ALLGEMEINER
TEILI 57 ff. (3d ed. 1981).
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thing-to the law as written by the legislature. My central concern in this article is this "filling out" of the code's text by the
general analytical system. In order to appreciate how this "filling
out" process operates, we turn first to a brief description of the
main elements of the system.
The general analytical system describes the main features of
criminal action with the German terms Tatbestandsmassigkeit
(definition of the offense), Rechtswidrigkeit (wrongfulness), and
Schuld (culpability).13 Whatever the governing code provision
may be, every criminal act must be wrongful and culpable conduct that conforms to (i.e., is violative of) the definition of the
offense. Unauthorized advertising can only be punished if it violates the definition, is wrongful, and is culpable. These central
elements are discussed with much effort and pomp in Germany.
13. These translations of the German terminology are necessarily rough and imperfect. The basic structural features of criminal action they identify and the contrasts between them have been explored a t length by Professor George P. Fletcher. See G.
FLETCHER,
RETHINKING
CRIMINAL
LAW454-504, 552-69, 575-79 (1978); see also Durham,
Book Review, 1979 UTAHL. REV.629, 634-40. In the main, the translations I am using
follow those used by Professor Fletcher, but a few comments are in order.
First, Tatbestandsmassigkeit connotes more than what American lawyers normally
mean by the definition of an offense. The first part of the word, Tatbestand, means
"that of which the [criminal] act consists." The suffix -massigkeit means "the state or
condition of being subject to." In actuality, then, the German term refers not to the
definition of an offense itself, but to the state of being subject to or in conformity with
(i.e., in violation of) the definition or prohibitory norm (which specifies what the criminal
act consists of). In many ways, the phrase "elements of an offense" constitutes a better
translation of the core term Tatbestand, since it preserves the German term's ambiguous
reference to both the norm and the prohibited conduct. One could thus translate
Tatbestandsmassigkeit as "the state or condition of fulfilling the defined elements of a
criminal offense." I t is simpler, however, to refer to this feature of criminal acts as the
definition of the offense, or as the state of fulfilling or violating the definition.
Turning to Rechtswidrigkeit, I prefer the translation "wrongfulness" to Fletcher's
rendition of the term as "wrongdoing." A literal translation would be "the state or condition of being against the law" or more simply "unlawfulness." I share Fletcher's view
that this is inadequate because, to an American reader, this might suggest that Rechtswidrigkeit has t o d o only with the state or condition of being inconsistent with positive
law. The German term Recht, which means both "law" and "right" has moral overtones
that are independent of positive law. While I thus agree with Fletcher on the major
translation issue here-namely,
that an unduly positivistic rendition should be
avoided-I prefer "wrongfulness" to "wrongdoing" because the former preserves the
sense that Rechtswidrigkeit is a characteristic of actions, rather than the "doing" itself.
Schuld could be literally translated as "guilt," but the question of guilt tends to be
thought of in English as the final determination that a defendant is criminally liable, not
as a more limited issue about whether the defendant may fairly be held accountable for
his conduct. "Culpability," with its overtones of accountability and moral responsibility,
is a closer translation.
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The discussion, however, has not achieved a conclusive result.14
A few main points, however, are undisputed.

a . T h e d e f i n i t i o n of a n o f f e n s e . T h e word
Tatbestandsmassigkeit embraces all of the elements of a particular crime that are found in the applicable code section. A rough
American equivalent would be the phrase "elements of the offense."16 There is a Tatbestand or definition of theft, homicide,
fraud, and so on. The problems of interpretation mentioned earlier16 that arise in connection with applying section 303 to "wild
postering" are questions about whether such conduct fits within
the scope of the definition of damaging property. A German law
student writing an exam on this issue, or for that matter, a German judge deciding a "wild postering" case, would be regarded
as engaging in improper analysis if he or she tried to treat these
questions at a different stage of the analysis-i.e., as an issue of
wrongfulness or culpability.
Demanding that the problem of determining which legal interest is protected by section 303 be treated as a problem of the
definition of damaging property affects more than the mere formal ordering of legal analysis. This demand also aids the decision of substantive issues. The content of the definition of a
crime cannot be extended beyond that formulated by the legislature. In the context of section 303, for example, the authority of
the property owner to determine what may happen to his property is protected only to the extent this authority is asserted to
prevent damage to, or destruction of, the property. From this
perspective it would take a strained interpretation to hold unauthorized advertising to be a violation of section 303, since such
conduct leaves the property intact and intrudes solely upon the
owner's authority. Further, the notion of Tatbestandsmassigkeit
itself, in its German usage, necessarily implies that the perpetrator's deed ( T a t ) be unambiguously and conspicuously antisocial.
If, however, the definition of the crime of damaging property
were tied to the authority of the owner to control his property,
the determination of whether a particular act satisfied the elements of the definition would be dependent upon whether the
property owner viewed the act as an incursion upon his author14. See H . JESCHECK.
LEHRBUCH
DES STRAFRECHTS.
ALLGEMEINER
TEIL159-72 (3d ed.
1978); E. SCHMIDHAUSER,
STRAFRECHT:
ALLGEMEINER
TEIL159 ff. (2d ed. 1975).
15. See supra note 13.
16. See supra text accompanying note 11.
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ity. But this latter definition does not comport with accepted
theory concerning the nature of the definition of criminal acts.
Thus, this theory makes it more difficult to punish "wild postering" as a violation of section 303.17
b. Wrongfulness. Rechtswidrigkeit, or wrongfulness,
embraces all the statutory and extrastatutory general grounds
for holding that conduct which is violative of the definition may
still be found to be justified, thereby escaping punishment. Selfdefense is a classic justification that negates the wrongfulness of
an act. The right to free speech, which some "wild posterers"
cite as the source of the legitimacy of their activity, is a doubtful
justification in their case;lBbut it is in any event an argument
that must be legally analyzed under the heading of wrongfulness. The category of wrongfulness in the general analytical system not only provides the proper place for the discussion of such
justifications but also provokes the discussion of doubtful
justification.
c. Culpability. The first task of the element of Schuld
or culpability in the general analytical system is to secure the
status of culpability as an indispensible prerequisite to punishment. A result of the culpability requirement is that the lawyer
must carefully consider possible grounds for excusing the actor,
even though his conduct is violative of the definition of the
crime and is wrongful. Insanity and duress are illuminating examples of the doctrines that serve to negate culpability in this
manner. A party availing himself of either of these defenses typically claims that while he has engaged in conduct specified in
the definition of some crime, and though he has done so without
justification, he cannot fairly be held responsible for what he
did.
Legal discussions of unauthorized advertising commonly encounter the view that this conduct conforms to the definition of
damaging property and is wrongful. Those who defend this position are not, however, finished with their analysis. They must
take up the further problem presented by the possibility that
the actor thought he had a right to paste up posters. In the
terms of the theory of the general analytical system, this is a
17. See OLG.Karlsruhe, W.Ger., 1978 JZ 72; Thoss, supra note 9, at 1613.
18. Just as in the United States, free speech rights in West Germany constitute constraints on state action, and do not confer unfettered license to encroach on the rights of
others.

314

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I984

problem of culpability. A perhaps overly simplistic formulation
is that the category of culpability marshals all of the arguments
favoring a finding of not guilty that are based on the subjective
state of the accused and insures that they are considered in
every case.

C. Application of the General Analytical System
Knowledge of the statute and the general system for analyzing criminal acts are the two tools of analysis that the German
criminal lawyer must employ in order to decide every case. The
law student must, from the very beginning of his studies, become sure of his ability to handle both. The practicing criminal
lawyer is, for the most part, uninterested in the subtleties of the
academic discussion of refinements in the theory of the general
analytical system, but he recognizes that the basic elements of
the structure guide his work. This can be seen in the German
courts' decisions on unauthorized advertising. Judges apply the
general analytical system as a matter of course as the framework
for analyzing and deciding cases.'@
The use of these two tools of analysis is made more interesting by a further feature of the legal landscape. The power to
decide cases is not evenly distributed between the statute and
the general analytical system. Rather, the latter is given priority.
Law students learn, for example, that a statute can only be applied in a manner permitted by the system. Every statute must
submit to being reordered and reinterpreted by way of the general analytical system before it can be applied. The statute as
formulated by the legislature is not applied directly; prior to application the statute is passed through the sieve of this system
and undergoes a structural metamorphosis in that process.
Thus, the provision of the German Criminal Code covering
damage to property is not applied directly and verbatim to the
case of unauthorized advertising. I t must first be subjected to
the strict regimen of the general analytical system. Its provisions
must first be dissected into the categories of the definition,
wrongfulness, and culpability, and only then applied.
19. See, e.g., OLG, Oldenburg, W. Ger., 1978 JZ 70; OLG, Karlsruhe, W. Ger., 1978
NJW 1636; 29 BGHST 129.
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It can be concluded from the discussion to this point that
the general system for analyzing criminal acts is successfully
able to force conformity with its dictates upon criminal statutes.
Its structuring of legal materials and legal analysis transcends
the dictates of the positive law. This is a rather remarkable state
of affairs. In accord with the tradition in Europe since the Renaissance, German criminal law is inseparably bound to legislation. The maxim nulla poena sine lege, with its requirements of
prospectivity and fair warning by statute, is a zealously guarded
constitutional principle in West Germany;20 and yet, the same
criminal law that is supposedly bound to and by legislation
yields to the nonlegislated general system for analyzing criminal
acts.
I want to discuss some troubling aspects of this relationship
between legislation and the general analytical system. The goal
is to justify, if possible, the preeminent position of this system
vis-a-vis legislation.

A. Transpositive Features of the General Analytical System
The German Criminal Code itself does not require that attention be paid to the general system for analyzing criminal acts.
The Code does presuppose application of the system a t many
points. The words for definition, wrongfulness, and culpability
are repeatedly usede21But this is not a consistent legislative
practice. No provision exists from which one could derive the
legislative intent that the structure be used in applying the
Code's sections.
German scholars of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries thought that they could derive the main features of the
general structure by studying the text of the Code.22 They
thought of the Code as a kind of physical object, and hoped that
by constantly observing it they could discover its inner order.
20. GRUNDCESETZ
[GG] art. 103 abs. 2 ( W . Ger.); STGB 8 1 ( W . Ger.); see P. BOCKALLGEMEINER
TEIL10 ff. (3d ed. 1979); J. WESSELS, STRAFRECHT:
ALLGEMEINER
TEIL8 ff. (12th ed. 1982).
21. See, e.g., STGB •˜ 11 abs. 1 nr. 5 (W. Ger.); see also id. $8 13, 17, 20, 32, 34, 35.
DIE LEHREVOM VERBRECHEN
(1906); K. BINDING.
DIE
22. See, e.g., E. BELING.
NORMEN
UND IHRE UBERTRETUNC (1872); F. VON LISZT, LEHRBUCH
DES DEUTSCHEN
STRAFRECHTS
116 ff. (14th ed. 1905).
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The structure of offenses seemed to be a kind of scientific discovery. The requirement of respect for the structure was
founded on its status as a law of nature.
This justification of the preeminence of the general analytical system underestimates, however, the nature of the claim that
this system makes. This justification rests on the notion that the
main features of the general system are an intrinsic part of the
Code;23but the argument has a scarcely acceptable consequence.
Another set of statutes-for example, a code that did not recognize wrongfulness or culpability as prerequisites of punishment-would of necessity lead quickly and unswervingly to another theory of the structure of offenses. This is precisely what
the general analytical system will not allow. It is not tied to a
given body of positive law. Rather, the theory of the general analytical system requires that all positive legislation conform to
it.
The fact that the positive criminal law of a particular country a t a particular time happens to give credence to the categories of definition, wrongfulness, and culpability is a political accident. A theory of the general structure of crimes cannot be
founded on such an accident. P u t another way, the general system for analyzing crimes demands to be recognized even when
the positive criminal law does not conform to it. Legal theory
then becomes criticism of nonconforming positive law. At any
rate, it is clear that the general analytical system is not derived
from the positive law; on the contrary, it comes before and sets
itself above positive law.

B. The Propriety of Placing the General Analytical System
Above the Positive Law
We are left with the question of whether such patronizing
treatment of legislation is acceptable in a legal system in which
statute is supreme. With respect to this question, the credentials
of the general system for structuring criminal analysis are impressive. The system is often praised in German literature as the
guarantor of order, certainty, and impartiality in the application
of individual statutes.24 These credentials provide some insight
23. See, e.g., H. JESCHECK, LEHRBUCH
DES STRAFRECHTS:
ALLCEMEINER TEIL157 (3d
37-38 (11th ed. 1969); H. MAYER,
ed. 1978); H. WELZEL, DAS DEUTSCHE STRAFRECHT
STRAFRECHT:
ALLGEMEINER TEIL41-42 (1953).
DES STRAFRECHTS:
ALLCEMEINER TEIL155-57 (3d ed.
24. See H. JESCHECK. LEHRBUCH
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into the vastness of the claim staked out by the general analytical structure on the landscape of the criminal law. In Germany,
this general analytical system is the hallmark of sophisticated
lawyerly professionalism. Let legislators write the statutes as
they please-our structure insures at least order, certainty, and
impartiality in the statutes' application. This is the first clear
signal that the general analytical system entails more than a formal model that helps one better organize and explicate statutory
language. Embodied within the general system for structuring
criminal analysis are certain basic elements that are essential to
any process that calls itself just.
Admittedly, an explanation of why the general analytical
system developed its particular structural features (i.e., violation
of the definition, wrongfulness, and culpability) is still required.
A continuing respect for these elements promotes order, certainty, and impartiality in the administration of justice. But
these goals are attainable in other ways. One could, for example,
number the characteristics of a particular crime arbitrarily, beginning with number one and ending when each characteristic
had been assigned a number. Order, certainty, and impartiality
could be insured by requiring courts to work down this checklist
in every case.26
However, much more than the simple, formal ordering of
the process of deciding an individual criminal case is sought in
German criminal law by invoking the general system for analyzing criminal acts and, in particular, by structuring analysis in
terms of the categories of violation of the definition, wrongfulness, and culpability. These categories seek rather to impose certain substantive values in connection with the making of particular decisions-values that are not necessarily contained in the
individual criminal statutes being applied.
The substance imparted by the three main categories of the
general analytical structure is different for each category. The
category of violation of the definition seeks to insure that the
criminal justice system does not impose criminal liability without first establishing that a precise statutory rule has been broken by the perpetrator. The category of wrongfulness seeks to
1978); Welzel, Zur Dogmatik im Strafrecht, in FESTSCHRIFT
FUR MAURACH
3 (1972).
25. Element analysis under the American Law Institute's MODELPENAL
CODEproceeds in essentially this fashion. It assumes that the process of carving up the characteristics of a crime is essentially arbitrary, and that the only genuine issue to be faced in
making a determination of liability is whether all the elements have been satisfied.
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insure that general justificatory exceptions militating against liability are sought, clarified, and considered in every case. The
category of culpability seeks to insure that punishment does not
follow on the mere showing that, objectively viewed, a rule has
been violated without justification. It forces attention to the person of the perpetrator and requires special attention to the excuses he offers for his
Clearly, then, the substantive values of the general analytical structure entail a precise legal program. In order to shore up
this program against the ever present risk of legislation that
runs afoul of its dictates, and especially to safeguard its authority in times when the positive legislation of a country tends toward disregarding it, secure foundations must be found to justify
and protect the program.
In Germany, as in the United States, constitutional principles are cited for this purpose. The category of violation of'the
definition as a general characteristic of crime is commonly
thought to be founded on the provision in the West German Basic Law (Grundgesetz, the West German constitutional document) that punishment can only be legislatively ~rescribed.~'
Another commonly defended position attempts to ground the
status of culpability as a general prerequisite of punishment on
the article of the Basic Law that declares the dignity of the person to be i n v i ~ l a b l e . ~ ~
But these efforts to derive some of the features of the general analytical system from constitutional provisions are not so
much genuine justifications as displays of the European tendency to argue for every legal conception as if it had legislative
origins. In fact, West Germany has no constitutional provision
requiring that, for conduct to be punishable, it must, in addition
to being violative of a statute, satisfy the various categories of
the general system for analyzing criminal acts. That is, the insistence that criminal liability attaches only where conduct violates
a definition and is wrongful and culpable is not rooted exclusively in constitutional provisions. The most that one can say is
26. See supra note 12.
27. GG art. 103, abs. 2.
LEHRBUCH
DES STRAFRECHTS:
ALLGE28. GG art. 1, abs. 1. Compare H. JESCHECK,
MEINER TEIL99 ff. (3d ed. 1978); W. NAUCKE.
STRAFRECHT.
EINEEINFBHRUNG
102 ff. (4th
ed. 1982).
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that the cited West German constitutional provisions and the
general structure of offenses can be traced back to a common
legal tradition.

C. The General Analytical System and Just Punishment
This tradition is the real foundation for the demand that
the positive law only be applied as the general analytical structure allows. The structure represents the results of lengthy deliberations in the realms of political and moral philosophy, as
well as the result of numerous experiments in real world politics.
This is, to be sure, a rather sweeping statement. We would
do well to try to flesh out more precisely the meaning of the
contention that the general system for analyzing criminal acts
imparts the most durable results of prolonged endeavors in political and moral theory and practice.
What is meant is primarily that this general analytical
structure is not merely a scholarly or legislative construction. It
is instead a reservoir of political experience gained during
lengthy periods of legal history. One could probably show that
the basic features of the theory were already known and valued
long before the beginning of the modern history of criminal law.
The political experience that the general analytical structure of offenses seeks to secure for the decision of every case can,
in my opinion, be described more or less as follows: Deviation
from the accepted norms of society should not be responded to
with uncontrolled violence. The first reaction, rather, should be
to try to gain distance from the deviant event. This distance is
attained by binding oneself to a definite and formal pattern of
analysis.
To phrase the idea pointedly, applying the statute according
to the program of the general analytical structure is a contrasting image to a violent act as well as to any summary execution of
punishment. The general system for analyzing criminal acts reflects the discursive, objective way in which Western philosophical tradition thinks about a subject-crime
and punishment-that offers resistance to the tendency to react to breaches
of established norms with unfettered and arbitrary power. The
degree to which a theory of the general structure of offenses like
the German theory is followed is an indication, I believe, of the
distance that a system of criminal law has put between itself and
the direct, forceful, and manipulative imposition of the will of
the majority on deviant individuals in society. The general ana-
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lytical structure, or its functional equivalent, is thus not only a
practical criterion to be applied in deciding particular cases, but
also an indicator of the level of criminal law culture a particular
society has attained.
From the vantage point of the general analytical structure
and its use, one is able to specify the position of the criminal in
the criminal process. The structure, whose main features I have
described, guarantees that the criminal is in a precisely definable
legal position regardless of the exact construction of a particular
statute. The general structure guarantees (I) that the particular
statutory violation must be established (fulfillment of the requirements of the definition); (2) that the criminal can defend
himself with general justifications of his conduct (wrongfulness);
and (3) that attention is devoted to the accused as a person by
allowing him to raise any relevant excusing conditions
(culpability).
The theory of the general system for analyzing criminal acts
thus contains the minimum conditions that must be maintained
if punishment is to be just. The demand that the positive law
only be enforced within the framework described by the structure is nothing more than the demand that the minimum conditions for just punishment be p r e s e r ~ e d . ~ ~

IV. CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion has established that the relationship between the German criminal theory's general analytical
structure and the positive law has a number of important
features.
First, whatever the content of everchanging criminal laws
may be, the structure of offenses imbues the decision of every
case with the results of long-term, extrastatutory considerations
of justice that constitute some of our deepest traditions in criminal law. The general structure represents politically, philosophically, and morally proven traditions in a quickly evolving world
of expedient legislation. There is much in the considerations
that have shaped the theory of the general analytical structure
that is traceable to particular European or German developments. I believe some of these developments to be responses to
29. See W. NAUCKE,
STRAFRECHT:
EINEEINFUHRUNG
240 ff. (4th ed. 1982); W.
NAUCKE.
GRUNDLINIEN
EINER RECHTSSTAATLICHPRAKTISCHEN ALLGEMEINEN STRAFTATLEHRE
(1979).
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issues that are distinctively German and that do not have
broader ramifications for other legal cultures. But it would be
premature to treat problems concerning the general analytical
structure as problems of a single country's law.30 Discussions
with American colleagues have convinced me that the basic features of the structure are clearly perceptible in American law.
This lends credence to the view that the values implicit in the
general system for analyzing criminal acts have a natural lawlike
character that transcends national boundaries.
Second, it appears that, at least to some extent, the emergence of a general system for analyzing criminal acts depends on
accidents of national, political, legal, and, in particular, procedural developments. But if, as I have argued, the recognition
and application of the general analytical system is an indicator
of the level of criminal law culture a particular society has attained, then work on refining and developing the theory of such
systems of analysis cannot be limited by national boundaries.
Finally, while linguistic usage and legal conceptualization in
the theory of general systems for structuring legal analysis may
differ from country to country, it should not be difficult to examine the results of national discussions of such issues in fruitful ways. By focusing on the contribution these discussions make
to clarifying and refining the place of the criminal law in a democracy, we can make joint strides toward a larger objective: the
furtherance of justice in punishment.

30. For an extended analysis of the features of the general analytical structure disRETHINKING
CRIMIcernible in common law approaches to criminal law, see G. FLETCHER,
NAL LAW391-875 (1978).

